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Abstract
This article
• criticises Plantinga’s claim that basic design beliefs
have more positive epistemic status than non-basic
ones;
• criticises Plantinga’s claim that we cannot evaluate
the probabilities involved in design arguments;
• presents a diﬀerent reason why Paley arguments of-
ten are unsuccessful.
1 Plantinga’s claim about design arguments
Professor Plantinga, in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies:
Science, Religion, and Naturalism (2011), claims that design ar-
guments for the existence of God are best construed, not as argu-
ments with premises and conclusions, but as ‘design discourses’
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which produce beliefs in design. Reading texts with design argu-
ments, like William Paley’s (1802) or Michael Behe’s book Dar-
win’s Black Box (1996), produces in many readers the impression
and the belief that God has ‘designed’ the animals. This belief,
like perceptual beliefs, can have ‘a great deal of warrant or posit-
ive epistemic status for you, even if you don’t know of any good
argument from other beliefs for the belief in question – even,
indeed, if there aren’t any good arguments of that sort.’ (249)
In this article I shall criticise Plantinga’s claim that basic
design beliefs have more positive epistemic status than non-basic
ones. Furthermore, I shall defend Paley’s and Behe’s argument
against Plantinga’s objections and suggest that probabilistic reas-
oning is useful and rational also here. We can improve the epi-
stemic status of our beliefs about God and creation by investig-
ating nature and by looking for the best explanation of what we
find. I shall procede as follows:
• Clarify and discuss Plantinga’s use of the concepts ‘guided
evolution’ and ‘design’.
• Oﬀer a definition of ‘intervention’.
• Raise objections against Plantinga’s divine collapse-causation
view.
• Criticise Plantinga’s claim that basic design beliefs have
more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones.
• Defend Behe’s argument against Draper’s and Plantinga’s
objection.
• Criticise Plantinga’s claim that we cannot evaluate the
probabilities involved in Paley arguments.
• Present a diﬀerent reason why Paley arguments often are
unsuccessful.
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2 Guided evolution, design, and interventions
Discussing whether the theory of evolution is compatible with be-
lief in God or with Christian doctrine, Plantinga’s strategy is to
say that, while ‘guided evolution’ is compatible with Christian
belief, it is not compatible with it to believe that the ‘process
of evolution is unguided—that no personal agent, not even God,
has guided, directed, orchestrated, or shaped it’. (12) According
to this, I think, Plantinga calls also theistic evolution ‘guided’,
i. e. the theory that God arranged and sustained things so that
evolution would bring about plants and animals without any in-
terventions by God, and takes it to be compatible with Christian
belief. A very diﬀerent theory that he calls ‘guided evolution’ too
is the view that, although there was evolution in some sense, God
‘caused [I think Plantinga means by intervention] the relevant ge-
netic mutations’. (253)
This wide concept of ‘guided’ may be useful in order to em-
phasise that the theory of evolution as well as evolution with
some interventions are compatible with Christian belief. But, in
my view, for discussing design arguments we need to distinguish
between arguments that claim that God intervened from other
design arguments, such as the argument from fine-tuning, which
only claims that the universe has a beginning caused by God.
I find it diﬃcult to find in this book whether Plantinga actu-
ally believes that theistic evolution is true. He not only refrains
from expressing his view, but he even avoids the concepts with
which one could discuss the issue: he uses ‘guided evolution’ and
‘design’ in senses that do not imply whether God intervened, and
he refrains from defining ‘intervention’ clearly.
What is an intervention? Plantinga’s answer is tentative. He
clearly rejects attempts to rule out the possibility of interventions,
e. g. by the ‘Divine Action Project’, but he does not present a
clear definition or characterization of interventions. In my view,
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we can sharpen our ordinary idea of a divine intervention by link-
ing it to the notion of a causal process. I assume that there are
causal processes, for example a tidal wave is or is constituted
by a causal process. Causal processes have a direction, they are
heading in a certain direction. In my view, they can always
be stopped and there are thus no deterministic processes in the
usual Hobbesian and Laplacean sense, but nevertheless they have
a direction into which they are going unless something stops or
deflects it. (This refers to non-probabilistic processes. A prob-
abilistic process is special in that it may go one way or another
without there being a cause of it going the way it does.)
A divine intervention is an event brought about by God dir-
ectly which is incompatible with (or exactly similar to) an event
towards which a process was heading. As it is not the result of
a causal process, it has no preceding cause. It stopps or deflects
a causal process. By God ‘bringing about the event directly’ I
mean that the event has no preceding cause but its occurrence
is due to the agent. We can say that it is the decision or choice
of the agent, wherefore I call it a ‘choice event’. In my view, not
only God but also humans and animals can bring about choice
events. Furthermore, not only agents but also causal processes
can intervene into a causal process. When a billard ball hits an-
other one, that is an intervention, although not by an agent but
by a non-living thing. (For more on this, see Wachter 2003 and
Wachter 2009.)
It seems to me that Plantinga also uses the term ‘design’ in a
wide sense, including not only creation through interventions but
also theistic evolution. Again, that is useful for emphasising that
theistic evolution is compatible with theism, but for discussing
Paley’s and Behe’s design arguments, we need to narrow our
focus on the kind of argument that they are putting forward.
Let us therefore understand by a Paley argument an argument
for the existence of God that claims that God has intervened at
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least once in order to create some living being when there had
been some living being already.
3 Is Plantinga an occasionalist?
Let us have a look at Plantinga’s view of God’s action in the
world. Discussing what an intervention is, instead of giving a
definition of intervention, Plantinga puts forward tentatively a
view that he calls ‘divine collapse-causation’ (DDC):
[F]or any collapse [of a wave function] and the resulting ei-
genstate, it is God who causes that state to result. . . . God
is always acting specially, that is, always acting in ways
that go beyond creation and conservation. (116)
In my view, the data make it more likely that the collapse of
the wave function has to do with the interaction with the meas-
urement instruments, but let us put this issue aside. Plantinga
considers the obvious objection: ‘But doesn’t this result in di-
vine determinism, perhaps even occasionalism, in that God really
causes whatever happens at the macro-level?’ Plantinga’s reply
is in my view quite true, but not a reply to the objection. He
writes:
Just as it could be that God causes collapse-outcomes and
does so freely, so it could be that we human beings, du-
alistically conceived, do the same thing. Suppose human
beings, as the vast bulk of the Christian tradition has sup-
posed, resemble God in being immaterial souls or selves,
immaterial substances—with this diﬀerence: in their case
but not in his, selves intimately connected with a partic-
ular physical body. Suppose, further, God has endowed
human selves (and perhaps other agents as well) with the
power to act freely, freely cause events in the physical
world. In the case of human beings, this power could be
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the power to cause events in their brains and hence in their
bodies, thus enabling them to act freely in the world. And
suppose, still further, the specific proximate events human
beings can cause are quantum collapse-outcomes. The
thought would be that God’s action constitutes a theater
or setting for free actions on the part of human beings
and other persons—principalities, powers, angels, Satan
and his minions, whatever. God sets the stage for such
free action by causing a world of regularity and predict-
ability; but he causes only some of the collapse-outcomes,
leaving it to free persons to cause the rest. (119f)
Is DCC occasionalist? Plantinga does not clearly answer this
question, but I think it is not. Oaccasionalism is the view that
all events are not the result of causal processes but the result of
God’s, or some other agent’s, direct action. DCC assumes that
God and other agents cause directly only the eigenstates that
result from the collapse of the wave functions. The wave function
before the collapse presumably represents a causal process which
God sustains and which contains states that God does not cause
directly.
Does Plantinga think that God’s causing a collapse-outcome is
an intervention? He does not answer this question, but there are
two ways to spell out DCC here. First, a defender of DCC might
say that God’s causing a collapse-outcome is an intervention,
presumably an intervention into a probabilistic process. We can
call this the quantum intervention view. Second, a defender of
DCC might negate this and say instead that each process leading
to the collapse of the wave function simply ends there, without
anything intervening. God would have to re-create matter after
each collapse. We can call this the re-creation view.
To the quantum intervention view I would object this: Why
does God intervene at each collapse of a wave function? If God
causes directly a collapse-outcome, that is an intervention into
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the probabilistic process even if the process would have led, with
some probability, to the same event. And why does God never
intervene at other points? Further, does not the evidence suggest
that there are at the quantum level probabilistic processes, with
the various possible outcomes having certain probabilities? That
suggests that God does not intervene at each collapse.
To the re-creation view, I would object that there are reasons
for God to give matter the power to persist for longer. DCC, as
opposed to occasionalism, implies already that there is secondary
causation, i. e. that there are material causal processes. Some
material states of aﬀairs are caused by preceding material states
of aﬀairs while God sustains them. They are not brought about
by God directly. So causation through created things is possible.
Why then should God make matter so that it ceases to exist at
each collape of a wave function? A material world that persists
so that it does not need frequent re-creation seems more beautiful
and more ingenious. Furthermore, it allows humans and animals
to foreknow the probable consequences of their actions without
God’s interventions being required.
One could object that God (as well as men and animals) can
act freely only when the processes involved stop. But there
is no reason to believe in non-stoppable processes as Hobbes,
Spinoza, and Kant did. Processes can be stopped, or diverted,
by material processes as well as by animals and humans. (As ar-
gued in Wachter 2012.) The idea that God has endowed human
selves with the power to cause freely events in the physical world,
as Plantinga sketches it in the passage quoted above, is better
spelled out as follows: God created a material world in which
created things can cause (thus there are ‘causae secundae’) and
depend on being sustained by God. There are therefore material
causal processes, which give rise to causation as well as to per-
sisting things. They carry on as long as God sustains them and
nothing stopps them, but they can be stopped: by other mater-
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ial processes, by animals, or by the actions of created rational
embodied or disembodied persons, or by God.
4 Plantinga’s view on design arguments
Now we can examine Plantinga’s position on Paley arguments,
i. e. arguments for the existence of God which claim that God has
intervened at least once in order to create some living being when
there had been some living being already. Let us mean by ‘the
theory of evolution’ here the claim that all animals have evolved
through natural processes from non-living matter, without any
interventions by disembodied persons like God. This sense is
wide in that it does not specify which natural processes (e. g.
mutation and selection) and narrow in that it includes the evol-
ution of life from non-living matter.
Let me summarise Plantinga’s view. He suggests (in ch. 8)
that Paley’s and Behe’s arguments, taken as arguments from
certain premises to certain conclusions, are weak. Behe argues,
and illustrates with much biological detail, that there are many
animals and parts of animals which are very unlikely to have
evolved, because they have or give an advantage in survival only
if many of their parts and properties are exactly as they are.
They are machines with many parts. If one part is missing or
slightly diﬀerent, the machine does not work and thus gives no
advantage in survival. He calls such things ‘irreducibly complex
systems’. For example, the bacterial flagellum has a motor with a
rotor. The motor functions, and thus gives a survival advantage,
only if very many proteines and other parts are exactly as they
are and in the right place. But the theory of evolution has to
assume that all animals evolved through many small changes
each of which gave an advantage in survival.
Against Behe, Plantinga puts forward Draper’s (2002) objec-
tion, who points out that it could be that the systems Behe de-
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scribes are not irreducibly complex. They might have evolved in-
directly, i. e. via systems which had some other function through
which they gave a survival advantage. Plantinga concludes that
Behe’s argument ‘is by no means airtight’. (231) He adds briefly
the objection that ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how low’ the
probability of the unguided evolution of, for example, protein
machines is.
Plantinga claims that while design arguments are not very suc-
cessful, ‘design discourse’ produces design beliefs with a high epi-
stemic quality. Seeing some animal or reading about some bac-
terium, often people get the impression that it is designed. There
is then, according to Plantinga, no inference from premises to a
conclusion involved. The belief is not based on an argument or
on evidence or on other beliefs. The belief is a ‘basic’ belief.
‘Perhaps what is going on in the arguments like Behe’s [. . . ]
can be better thought of as like what is going on in [cases] where
it is perception (or something like it) rather than argument that is
involved.’ (237) I have not discovered whether Plantinga endorses
the claim that some people’s design beliefs are justified through
apparent perceptions of design (often in this book found it hard
to find out which claims exactly Plantinga is defending), but he
does endorse the more general claim that some people have basic
design beliefs that are produced by design discourse and therefore
have ‘a great deal of warrant or positive epistemic status for you’.
(249)
Plantinga believes that basic design beliefs have more positive
epistemic status than non-basic ones because they are subject
to fewer sorts of criticisms. Non-basic beliefs ‘can be criticised
in terms of the cogency of the argument. We can ask whether
the argument is valid, i. e., whether the conclusion really follows
from the premises; we can also ask whether the premises are true;
we can also ask whether the argument is circular, or begs the
question, or is in some other way dialectically deficient. None
10
of these sorts of criticism is relevant to beliefs formed in the
basic way.’ (251) If a design belief arises spontaneously, then it
has more positive epistemic status for you than if arises through
thinking about it.
5 What is a basic belief?
I shall now argue, against Plantinga, that design beliefs are
not basic and that Paley arguments are more successful than
Plantinga suggests. For this I need to consider what a basic
belief is and how it can be criticised.
What is a basic belief? Consider a perceptual belief. When
Miller looks at a field and sees a cow, he comes to believe that
there is a cow. This belief is justified or supported or made more
rational or made more probable to some degree by the perceptual,
visual experience, or by Miller’s belief in it. Plantinga prefers not
to use these words, instead he says that it has ‘a great deal of
warrant or positive epistemic status’ for Miller. (248) Suppose
that Miller, besides his visual experience, has no evidence for
there being a cow: he has seen no hoof marks or cowpat, and
for all he knows there is a fence around the field. So his beliefs
would rather lead him to expect that there are no cows on the
field. That is the kind of situation to which Plantinga’s concept of
a basic belief applies (cf. Plantinga 2000, p. 83): The person has
no evidence or argument at all for the belief; he does not believe
that the cows on the field explain something that he believes.
Now consider the relationship of one belief supporting another
one. Suppose that Jones sees cowpat and hoof marks in his
garden and concludes that there was a cow. Let us call his belief
that there was a cow the hypothesis, h, and Jones’ belief that
there is cowpat (or, if you prefer, the cowpat itself) the evid-
ence, e. h provides, with some probability, an explanation for
e, because the cow might well have caused the cowpat. We can
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then say that e is evidence for h and that Jones inferred h from
the evidence, or that Jones believes that e makes h probable, or
that e is evidential or inferential support for h. The term ‘evid-
ence’ (in German ‘Evidenz’) used to be used, e. g. by John Locke,
Franz von Brentano, and Edmund Husserl, for a priori, intuitive,
self-evident knowledge, while today it is, to the contrary, used
for beliefs (or their objects) that make a hypothesis probable.
(For example in Swinburne 2001, pp. 135–139.) Let us therefore
use ‘evidence’ only in the latter sense of inferential support, so
that support through a perceptual experience is not evidence or
evidential support.
We can say about Miller’s visual experience as well as about
his belief in the cowpat that they support, justify, or make more
rational the belief in question. Only a belief is usually said to
make more probable a hypothesis, although one could say this
also about a perceptual experience.
Perceptual beliefs are not the only basic beliefs, i. e. beliefs
without inferential support. Other basic beliefs are supported by
experiences other than perceptions (or one could define ‘percep-
tion’ as wide as ‘experience’) or through intellectual (a priori)
knowledge (or one could include this in the concept of percep-
tion) or through memory, and you can believe something where
you do not remember how you acquired this belief. The latter
case would be an unsupported basic belief.
In my view, a belief that has perceptual or other non-inferential
support can additionally be supported by evidence. (I have not
found that Plantinga considers that possibility.) If Miller first
sees hoof marks in the field and thinks ‘It seems that cows have
entered the field’ and then sees a cow in the field, then his belief h
is supported by evidence as well as by a perceptual experience.1
So a belief can have any mixture of evidential and non-evidential
1This is developed in more detail in Swinburne 2001, 139f.
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support. We could mean by a basic belief one which the person
believes not only because it is supported by evidence (and thus is
at least partially non-inferential). But Plantinga roughly means
by a basic belief one that has no inferential support through
providing an explanation for something else that he believes.
6 How can basic beliefs be criticised?
Now consider how basic beliefs can be criticised. All beliefs can
be criticised by giving counter-evidence. Further, a belief can be
criticised by criticising its support. Plantinga calls that ‘under-
cutting defeaters’. (165, 251–256) Diﬀerent kinds of support have
to be criticised diﬀerently. Miller’s perceptual belief that there is
a cow because he has seen it can be criticised by suggesting that
his eyes do not work properly: by pointing out that there is an
elk which one can easily mistake for a cow, or that he is under
drugs, or that there is an evil demon who manipulates his mind.
Jones’ inferential belief that there was a cow in his garden be-
cause he has seen the hoof marks can be criticised by suggesting
a better explanation for the data: by pointing out that an elk’s
hoof marks look similar, or that Smith had told that he intended
to deceive Jones by producing marks in the garden.
Plantinga argues that design beliefs produced by design dis-
course are not subject to criticisms of the inference because they
are basic. I reply that it is wrong to conclude from the fact that
the person does not reason step by step from premises to the con-
clusion that the belief is not subject to criticism of the inference.
It is the other way round: Examining whether a belief is subject
to criticism of an inference is one way to determine whether it
is at least partly inferential. Beliefs can be inferential, and thus
subject to criticism of the inference, even if the person does not
reason step by step from premises to a conclusion.
For example, seeing the hoof marks in his garden Jones might
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immediately, without any explicit reasoning from premises to a
conclusion, have a strong impression that the marks were pro-
duced by a cow. Nevertheless his belief that there was a cow or
his belief that the marks were produced by a cow clearly is not
basic. For two reasons: First, there is no memory and no per-
ceptual (or other) experience whose content involves a cow in his
mind. Both beliefs would be based on a perceptual experience
only if he believed to see, or in some other way to be in contact
with, a cow. Secondly, both beliefs clearly are subject to criti-
cisms of inference, and not subject to criticism of the functioning
of his sense organs. It is a valid criticism to object that there is
a more probable explanation for the marks on the ground. You
can say that the children yesterday produced the marks for fun
by hand, or that they brought an elk into the garden yesterday
and that elk hoof marks look similar to cow hoof marks. This is
to say that there is a better explanation of the data, and thus the
kind of objection which according to Plantinga does not apply to
design beliefs produced by design discourse. So some beliefs are
inferential and thus not basic although the person did not reason
explicitly step-by-step from premises to a conclusion.
Now let us examine design beliefs which are produced by design
discourse. In order to defend his claim that they have a high
epistemic status, Plantinga should say which kind of basic beliefs
they are. Are they supported or produced by perception, or
by some other kind of experience, or by memory, or are they
supported by nothing because we have forgotten why we believe
them? Plantinga does not say. But surely this matters. First
because on this it depends how high the epistemic status of the
belief is, and secondly because on this it depends what kind of
undermining defeater the belief is subject to.
The impression of design clearly is not a case of apparent
memory. We have no memories of the origin of the species. Is
it a case of perception? In a perception something seems to the
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person to be present to him, it seems to him that he is in contact
with it. Our design beliefs are never based on such an experience.
Nobody thinks that he perceives God, or someone else, designing
a species or an animal. In the impression of design it does not
seem to the person that he is in contact with the designer. That
is already clear through the fact that we believe that God did
the designing a long time ago. In this design beliefs diﬀer also
from beliefs in the existence of other minds, with which Plantinga
compares design beliefs. (245) Many believe that they perceive
animals which are designed, or animals which were created by
God with or without intervention, but nobody believes that he
perceives God designing the animals. We also have no other sort
of experience of design, such as intellectual knowledge.
So if design beliefs produced by design discourse are basic,
then they have no support at all. That does not seem to be true
either, because then we would just find ourselves with them and
not remember why and since when we have them. But we know
that we have them through design discourse, through observing
animals, and, in my view, through considering how likely it is
that all animals and plants evolved.
Furthermore, the trouble with basic beliefs hat have no sup-
port is that their epistemic status is low and is lowered easily by
objections. If you find yourself believing that it was Jones who
built your father’s house but cannot remember why you believe
this, then you should weaken or give up this belief as soon as
your mother tells you that it was built by Smith, or you find an
invoice by Smith, or you find out that Jones was not a builder but
a philosopher. Or if you find yourself believing in the theory of
evolution but do not know why you believe this, then you should
weaken or give up this belief if upon investigating the matter you
find evidence against it or little evidence for it.
More to the case, if design beliefs produced by design discourse
had no support at all, then, when we hear so many professors
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of biology aﬃrm that we know with certainty that the theory of
evolution is true, we should give up the design beliefs. Plantinga
wants to hold that some design beliefs are as resiliant against
probabilistic objections as my belief that I am seeing my old
friend White over there is resiliant against the objection that I
have not seen White for a long time and that White is living in
China. Perceptual experiences make it rational to believe things
that otherwise, on the basis of what we know or believe, would be
quite improbable. Of course, also the probability of perceptual
beliefs is aﬀected to some degree by the person’s other beliefs. I
should trust more my perceptual experience of a normal cow with
a trunk and antlers than my (equally clear) perceptual experience
of a cow with a trunk and antlers at another occasion. But per-
ceptual experiences, depending on how unambiguous they are,
can make for a person a proposition very probable that on his
other beliefs would be improbable. However, we do not have per-
ceptual experiences of God designing animals or plants. While
Plantinga claims that design beliefs which arise without inference
have a higher epistemic status than others, they have in fact less.
They would have a higher one only if they were based on a clear
perceptual experience.
I suggest that also design beliefs which arise through design
discourse without the person explicitly inferring them from some
premises are based on other beliefs. They depend on his beliefs
about animals and can be criticised by making the person believe
in the theory of evolution and thus in alternative explanations
of the existence of the animals. Behe’s book strengthens many
people’s design beliefs because it informs them about the exist-
ence of things which they did not know before, e. g. the bacterial
flagellum, and by demonstrating that they probably would not
exist if the theory of evolution were true.
I conclude that all design beliefs are subject to criticism of
the inference, and that objections which refer to the theory of
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evolution are – not less but – more eﬀective the less the person
examined the inference thoroughly, that is, the more they are
basic in Plantinga’s sense.
7 Draper’s objections to Behe’s argument
Let me defend Paley arguments against Draper’s objection, which
Plantinga endorses. It is of course true that something could
evolve indirectly, i. e. via things that have diﬀerent functions. But
Draper and Plantinga have done nothing to show that this raises
the probability of the theory of evolution significantly. Perhaps
Behe could have done more in order to show that it is improbable
that some or all of the complex systems which he presents have
evolved indirectly. But certainly his descriptions of the complex
systems do this to some degree. They give the reader new know-
ledge about biological systems and about how many things in
nature have and require many parts that are fit exactly for the
function that they have. For example, if the bacterial flagellum
evolved, then very many of its parts had some other function
before they came together to form the bacterial flagellum. But
many of its parts seem to be made exactly for the flagellum and
to have no other function. Therefore, even if Behe did not dis-
cuss indirect evolution explicitly, the probability that some or
even all complex systems which exist evolved seems low even if
we consider the possibility of indirect evolution.
Draper, however, only points to the mere possibility of indirect
evolution, without considering any real examples and biological
research. That diminishes the strength of Behe’s arguments only
insignificantly.
Plantinga writes that Draper has shown ‘that Behe’s conclu-
sion doesn’t deductively follow from his premises’ and that Behe’s
argument ‘is by no means airtight’. (231) I wonder why Plantinga
thinks that Behe wanted to propose an airtight argument with
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a conclusion that follows deductively from premisses. Of course
they are not airtight and not deductive. If they were, then they
would not be designed for changing the hearer’s beliefs, because
then the premises would contain the conclusion. Most arguments
that really aﬀect beliefs contain some deductive steps, such as a
reductio ad absurdum, but the crucial steps in all arguments, ex-
cept perhaps examples in modern logic books, are in some sense
inductive. They suggest that something is evidence for the hypo-
thesis, or they try to make the hearer perceive something. From
this point of view, Plantinga’s statement ‘that Behe’s conclusion
doesn’t deductively follow from his premises’ and that Behe’s
argument ‘is by no means airtight’ is trivial and no objection.
Not only does Plantinga not assume, as I would, that the argu-
ments that are worth discussing are all probabilistic, but he even
often ignores the possibility of probabilistic arguments. For ex-
ample when he concludes: ‘[T]he real significance of Behe’s work,
as I see it, is not that he has produced incontrovertible arguments
for the conclusion that these systems have been designed; it is
rather that he has produced several design discourses.’ (258) So
Plantinga considers whether Behe has ‘produced incontrovertible
arguments’ and whether he has produced ‘design discourses’, but
he ignores what clearly is Behe’s intention: to provide evidence
against, and thus diminish the probability of, the theory of evol-
ution.
Similarly, when considering in general how arguments can be
criticised, Plantinga mentions only the following: ‘[A belief formed
as the conclusion of an argument] can be criticized in terms of
the cogency of the argument. We can ask whether the argu-
ment is valid, i. e., whether the conclusion really follows from the
premises; we can also ask whether the premises are true; we can
also ask whether the argument is circular, or begs the question,
or is in some other way dialectically deficient.’ (251) Again, he
does not consider the possibility of objecting to an argument that
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the premises fail to make the conclusion more probable or that
the suggested evidence fails to support the hypothesis.
8 Against Plantinga, we can and should consider
how probable the theory of evolution is
Plantinga rejects probabilistic Paley arguments because he finds
it ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how low’ the probability of the ex-
istence of protein machines on the assumption of unguided evolu-
tion is. (235) Plantinga might be sceptical about all probabilistic
arguments, or he might be sceptical just about probabilistic ar-
guments for the existence of God. Let me first criticise general
scepticism. If probabilistic reasoning would be unreliable, de-
tectives and scientists could not evaluate the probability of their
hypotheses as they do, or their beliefs about the probability of
the hypotheses were wrong or unjustified. They often believe
that a certain person did a certain action where this belief is sup-
ported through evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA analysis,
and not through any perception or memory. They arrive at this
belief not in the basic way which Plantinga favours but by con-
sidering the probability of various explanations of the evidence
and by inference to the best explanation.
We generally assume that such probabilistic reasoning is the
right method and that it leads to justified and true beliefs. We
can often work out more or less well how much some item of
evidence supports a hypothesis. Detectives and scientists are es-
pecially trained in their respective fields to do this. By thinking
and investigating we can improve our skills of probabilistic reas-
oning, and we can discover mistakes that we or others made. We
can make progress in finding the true answer to a question by
thinking carefully by considering the evidence and by looking for
and finding more evidence.
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Sometimes probabilistic reasoning leads to false beliefs. This
may be because the person committed mistakes in the reasoning
and therefore ascribed the wrong probability to a proposition, or
because the evidence is misleading. The evidence can be slightly
misleading, so that for a certain person a false proposition is a
bit more probable than its negation. The evidence can even be
very misleading, so that for a certain person a false proposition
is very probable. But that is rarely so, and we generally do not
take this to be a reason for saying that probabilities are hard
in excelsis to evaluate or that trying to do so is of little use or
irrational.
I am pointing out that detectives and scientists often rely on
probabilistic reasoning in order to suggest that probabilistic reas-
oning, which often ascribes to beliefs high probabilities although
they are not at all obtained in Plantinga’s ‘basic way’, is rational.
One can still refrain from using it or say that it is not rational or
useful, but that is no reason for believing that it is not rational.
When we consider what rationality is and what is the correct way
to form beliefs about, for example, Paley arguments, in the end it
is a matter of decision what one says about it. But most people
assume that of the diﬀerent ways of forming one’s beliefs, some
are more truth-conducive or in some similar sense more correct
than others. Most people assume that probabilistic reasoning, as
detectives and scientists practise it, is rational and the correct
way to find out the truth. I suggest that they are right.
Sometimes we find it ‘hard to say’ how much some proposition
e supports some proposition h. There are then two possibilities.
First, e really does not support h. Second, there are more con-
nections between e and h to be discovered. We can then try to
increase our knowledge by looking for these connections and by
looking for more relevant facts. If we do not find more connec-
tions or have no time to search, the best we can do is to work
with the beliefs we have and thus to assume that e does not raise
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the probability of h. As long as we see no connections, we should
assume that there is no connection. That assumption is more
justified the more thoroughly we investigate the evidence and
the probabilistic connection between the evidence and the hypo-
thesis and the more we reason correctly. My objection against
Plantinga’s statement that ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how low’
the probability of the existence of protein machines on the as-
sumption of unguided evolution is that it is unjustified. He fails
to present to the reader an investigation of this probability, and,
in my view, his estimation of this probability is too low.
Today we have much knowledge which helps to evaluate Paley
arguments. Although, of course, if one assumes a very high prob-
ability of atheism, it is rational to assume also a high probability
of the theory of evolution, Behe’s and others’ work does much
to show that the probability of the existence of protein machines
on the assumption of unguided evolution, considered on its own,
is very low. Enormeous amounts of time, eﬀort, and money have
been invested into developing and proving the theory of evolu-
tion. The example of the protein machines illustrates that we
know very much in detail about animals and plants today. We
know the functions of many parts of animals and plants.
In order to evaluate alternative explanations, we do not need
detailed knowledge about all alternative explanations. When you
come into your oﬃce in the ground floor and see that the window
is broken and the pieces of broken glas as well as a paving stone
are lying on the floor, then there is the possibility that someone
arranged things so in order to create the misleading impression
that threw a stone into the window from outside. But it is not the
case that because you lack detailed knowledge about all possible
explanations, for example exactly how a meteorite could have
caused this, you find it hard in excelsis to say whether some
person or some impersonal process broke the window. You would
rightly assume that probably some person broke the window. If
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you said that you have no clue about how the window broke, that
would be a clear example of irrationality and faulty reasoning.
We can be irrational not only in ascribing too high probabilities,
but also in ascribing to low or no probabilities.
In the case of Paley arguments our situation is even better be-
cause we know so much about the details of the composition and
function of many parts of animals and plants, because we have
searched so thoroughly for evolutionary processes, and because
we have found so many mechanisms whose existence cannot be
explained well through the theory of evolution. The possibil-
ity that we will still find these evolutionary processes raises the
probability of the existence of all the plants and animals on the
assumption of unguided evolution to some degree. It remains
rational to look for natural processes leading from simple forms
of life to the development of the plants and animals and, we
may add, to look for natural processes leading from inanimate
matter to life. But the amount of research that has been done
already lowers the probability of the theory of evolution and of
the hypothesis of the unguided origin of life considerably.
But even if we can evaluate to some degree the probability
of the existence of protein machines on the assumption of un-
guided evolution, do we know enough about the probability of
the existence of protein machines on the assumption that there
is a ‘intelligent designer’ – P(e/h)? An intelligent designer might
want to create something else instead. But at least if we are
considering not just some ‘intelligent designer’ but God, we can
already see that he has much more reason to create a proteine
machine that something that has no beauty, no goodness, and
no function. There is a large range of things that God might
well have created instead. But for the argument to be successful,
P(e/h) does not have to be very low, it just has to be larger than
P (e/¬h). One may hold that the probability of hypotheses does
not have precise values, or that Bayesianism cannot model prob-
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abilistic reasoning correctly, or even that the calculus of probab-
ility cannot be applied to probabilistic reasoning, but in some
form probabilistic reasoning, as detectives and scientists practise
it, is truth-conducive and rational. It is at work also in Paley
arguments, as well as other design arguments, and provides evi-
cence for the existence of God. Of course, Paley arguments are
not deductive, ‘airtight’ (231), ‘cogent’ (249), or ‘incontrovert-
ible’ (258). But most or all arguments that can change beliefs
are not.
9 Why Paley arguments are sometimes
unsuccessful
There is a diﬀerent reason why Paley arguments often are un-
successful. In certain audiences many believe that the theory of
evolution is very well supported. Sometimes they say that it is
as well proven as the belief that the earth is spherical. Plantinga
criticises this attitude. He even argues that Darwinians have not
‘shown, for example, that it is not prohibitively improbable that
the mammalian eye has developed in this way from a light sensit-
ive spot’. (255) (One could object that this claim is incompatible
with Plantinga’s claim that it is ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how
low’ the probability of the existence of protein machines on the
assumption of unguided evolution is.) But if the audience be-
lieves firmly in the theory of evolution, no Paley argument can
rationally raise the probability of the existence of God for them.
Arguments that use premisses which the audience share already
are more successful.
Furthermore, if the audience believe or say that anyone who
does not believe very firmly in the theory of evolution is stupid,
irrational, a bad scientist, a bad philosopher, or a liar, that be-
lief or claim can lower the receptivity of the audience for the
23
arguments given by someone who uses Paley arguments. The
audience’s belief that the speaker is stupid should not influence
the audience’s evaluation of the speaker’s other arguments, but
often the audience will nevertheless, irrationally, be influenced
and often will not listen to or read the texts of this speaker.
They may well destroy his reputation and thus discourage also
other people from listening to this speaker. Therefore, in some
situations and for some audiences a philosopher will be more suc-
cessful in convincing people of the existence of God if he does not
use Paley arguments, even if in fact Paley arguments raise the
probability of theism.
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